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infinite liability, it is submitted that the balance is shifted in favor of
compensating bystanders who qualify under general tort principles.
The facts presented in Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital 4 demonstrate,
as clearly as any could, the arbitrary nature of the zone of danger rule
just as the case of the grandmother who was not hit by the bull 5 demonstrates this under the impact rule. Here the plaintiff was in the zone
of emotional risk, but not the zone of physical peril. The risk of emotional injury to the plaintiff was great and her presence was actually
in the mind of the employee who was bringing the baby to her. Clearly
under a general negligence rule she should have been granted an opportunity to prove her injuries. The statement that "[t]he Mephistophelian power of a rigid rule or talismanic phrase to hold analysis
in fetters is often encountered in tort law"'66 has once more been verified.
Michael R. Ezell

LANDLORD-TENANT-ExcULPATORY

CLAUSES-PUBLIC

AUTHORITY'S USE OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSE

HOUSING

IN LEASE AGREEMENT

Is NOT CONTRARY To PUBLIC POLICY. Crowell v. Housing Authority,
483 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ granted).

Appellants, as heirs, brought this suit against the public housing
authority under the Survival Statute, article 5525, Texas Revised Civil
Statutes Annotated, contending their father, Arbe J. Crowell, died
as the result of carbon monoxide poisoning from a defective gas
heater in the apartment leased to him by appellee. The appellants
contend the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, thereby giving effect to an exculpatory clause providing for the appellee's non-liability for any injuries to the tenant
from any cause whatever.1 Appellants base their argument on the
theory that the clause represents an attempt by the Dallas Housing
Authority to avoid its statutorily imposed duties to a class of persons it
was created to serve, and to allow the Authority to do so would be
against the public policy of this State. 2 The appellee argues that the
64 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
65 Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1958).
06 Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. Rav. 584, 584 (1961).

1 The exculpatory lease provides: ". . . nor shall the Landlord nor any of its representatives or employees be liable for any damage to person or property of the Tenant,
his family or his visitors, which might result from the condition of these or other
premises of the Landlord, from theft or from any cause whatever." Crowell v. Housing
Authority, 483 S.W.2d 846, 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ granted).
2 "To sue and to be sued . . . to carry into effect the powers and purposes of the
authority." TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, § 8(a) (1963).
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duties of a landlord to his tenants may be modified by a contract that
represents the mutual intent of the parties. The housing authority
rejects the contention that such a clause is contrary to the public
policy.3 Held-Affirmed. Exculpatory clauses used by a public housing authority in lease agreements are not contrary to the public policy.
The courts of this state have followed the majority rule that "[c]ontracts written or construed so as to allow indemnity for liability
arising out of the indemnitee's own negligence are not violative of the
public policy." 4 However, this rule is subject to exceptions as recognized in Spence & Howe Construction Co. v. Gulf Oil Co.,8 which
stated: "Of course, certain types of indemnity agreements may be contrary to public policy for various other reasons .... "I'
Public policy has always been a major factor in determining the
validity of exculpatory clauses used in contracts.7 Legislative enactments have determined public policy and court decisions have supported it. The meaning of the phrase is vague and variable, however,
and has been left free from any fixed rules and definitions.8 Public
policy has been categorized as being for the protection of the public or
. .. to investigate into living, dwelling, and housing conditions and into the means
and methods of improving such conditions; to determine where slum areas exist or
where there is a shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations for
persons of low income ....
Id. § 8(f) (emphasis added).
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this State that each housing authority
shall manage and operate its housing projects in an efficient manner . . . consistent
with its providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations . . . . Id. § 9
(emphasis added).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
3 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ
granted).
4 Fenn v. Burnett, 405 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, no writ);
accord, Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 430, 303 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957). The
Texas Supreme Court stated:
An obligation to hold harmless from claims, liability or damage resulting from a
specified operation or instrumentality will be enforced in accordance with its terms
even though the indemnitee may thereby be relieved of the consequences of his own
negligence.
See 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 188 (1964). "It is not the rule that any agreement by any
person which assumes to place another person at the mercy of his own faulty conduct is
void as against public policy."
5 365 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
6 Id. at 633. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACS §§ 572, 575 (Supp. 1965). Indemnity
agreements have been held contrary to public policy in cases where the indemnitee is
"dealing with the general public and whose business is affected with a public interest."
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Texas Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 181 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1950).
7 See Gilpin v. Abrahams, 218 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1963), appeal dismissed, 328 F.2d
884 (3d Cir. 1964); Nedow v. Nicholson, 381 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas court stated:
Ordinarily before a contract is found to be illegal it must be established that it
contravenes public policy in that it is contrary to statutory law or is immoral in
itself, and the injury to the public must be clearly apparent.
8 Kuzmiak v. glrookchester, 111 A.2d 42.5, 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955).
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public good, with the possible or probable effect of the agreement having primary importanceY
In Texas, courts have consistently refused to enforce exculpatory
clauses as being contrary to public policy in cases "involving the negligence of common carriers, public utilities, parking lot operators, innkeepers, [municipalities] and others who are dealing with the general
public and whose business is affected with a public interest .... .10
The validity of exculpatory clauses in other situations has been considered differently in many jurisdictions due primarily to the conflict
of two public policies-the obligation to be liable for one's negligence
versus the right of freedom to contract." These conflicting policies are
also present in determining the validity of this type of clause when
used in lease agreements. 12 The validity of an indemnity provision in
a lease agreement between private parties was upheld by the Texas
Supreme Court in Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman.13
It is now necessary to determine whether in the Crowell case this
general rule should be expanded to include a "public" landlord-tenant lease agreement. In Crowell, the appellants argue that the general
rule does not apply to their case and base their argument on the fact
that the Dallas Housing Authority is not a private landlord but instead is an agency dealing with the public's interest. 1 4 Though no
Texas authority was cited directly in point, the court did cite two
other jurisdictions which reached conflicting conclusions.' 5
In Housing Authority v. Morris,6 the Alabama Supreme Court held
that the purpose of the statute which created the housing authority was
to provide safe and sanitary housing for persons of low income and
9 Uvalde Constr. Co. v. Shannon, 165 S.W.2d 512, 513 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942,
no writ); see 13 Tax. JUR. 2d Contracts § 171 (1960).
10 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Texas Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 181 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir.
1950); see Chicago & N.W, Ry. v. Davenport, 205 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 930 (1954); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Veal, 378 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dittmar v. City of New Braunfels, 48 S.W. 1114 (rex. Civ. App.
1899, no writ).
11 Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 155 N.E.2d 372, 379 (Il. Ct. App.
1958). This court questions the distinction made between the protection of the public on
common carriers from providing the public with a safe place to live and work. Id. at 384.
12 It is generally agreed that a landlord may by a contract with his tenant lawfully
relieve himself from liability for any and all damages including liability for negligence.
49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 869 (1970); accord, Barclay Woolen Corp. v. W.E.
Hulton Dyeing Co., 220 F. Supp. 598, 600 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman,
157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957). But cf. Manius v. Housing Authority, 39 A.2d 614
(Pa. 1944); Thomas v. Housing Authority, 426 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1967).
13 157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957).
14 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex, Civ. App.- Tyler 1972,
writ granted).
15 Id. at 866, 867; Housing Authority v. Morris, 14 So. 2d 527 (Ala. 1943); Manius v.
Housing Authority, 39 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1944).
16 14 So. 2d 527 (Ala. 1943).
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therefore refused to allow the authority to escape a duty imposed by
law.17
After approving the general rule upholding exculpatory clauses in
private lease agreements, the court in Crowell adopted the decision in
Manius v. Housing Authority 8 which allowed a public housing
authority to contract for non-liability.' 9 The decision in Crowell was
based on the court's interpretation of article 1269k, sections 8 and 9.20
Section 8 grants the housing authority all the powers necessary or
convenient to carry out the purposes of the act including the power to
make and execute contracts necessary to the exercise of the powers of
the authority. 21 The act further provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this State that each
Housing Authority shall manage and operate its housing projects in an efficient manner so as to enable it to fix the rentals for
dwelling accommodations at the lowest possible rates consistent
with its providing decent, safe and sanitary dwelling accommoda22
tions ....
The court in Crowell then concluded that "[t]he Housing Authority
is not a public utility or a common carrier or a municipality whose
business is affected with a public interest and whose service many times
must be used exclusively by the public. '23 The court's conclusion is
based on the belief that a strict construction of sections 8 and 9 of
article 1269k manifests an intention by the legislature to allow the
24
authority to contract in an exculpatory manner.
In reaching this result, the court necessarily placed more emphasis
on its interpretation of section 8 which grants the authority to contract,
than on section 9 which expresses the purpose of the Authority to
provide decent safe and sanitary low-rent housing. 25 The court's construction of these two sections merits a critical analysis of the law and
Id. at 530-31.
39 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1944).
19 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972,
writ granted).
20 Id. at 867; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, §§ 8, 9 (1963).
21 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, § 8 (1963).
22 Id. § 9 (emphasis added); see Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79
(1940).
23 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 846, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972,
writ granted); accord, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Texas Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 181 F.2d 923 (5th
Cir. 1950); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Veal, 378 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ
ref'd).
24 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 846, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972,
writ granted).
25 See generally Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, §§ 8, 9; Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ granted).
17
18
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the purpose for which the Authority was created, especially in a case
of first impression in Texas.
Most courts which have declared exculpatory clauses invalid "have
done so on the strength of specific legislation, such as public housing
codes, which place affirmative public duties upon landlords. ' 26 Generally, it has been held that a person may not contract against liability
27
in violation of a positive duty imposed by law as expressed by statute.
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted article 1269k as follows:
A reading of both the Federal and Texas acts demonstrates that
the purposes sought are the elimination of slum conditions and
the providing of safe 28and sanitary dwelling accommodations for
persons of low income.
This interpretation of the article's purpose indicates the supreme
court places an emphasis on section 9 which was absent in the court
29
of civil appeals decision in Crowell.
In Manius, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a very brief opinion,
superficially discussed the legislative intent and purpose of the housing
authority.80 The court failed to mention the purpose of the Authority
to provide safe housing for persons of low income, but simply concluded that the purpose which created the housing authority would
not justify the imposition of a restriction upon its power to contract. 8 1
In adopting this reasoning and rejecting that given in Morris, the
court in Crowell chose to cite only one principle presented in the
opinion.
[A]greements exempting persons from liability for negligence induces a want of care, and it is a good doctrine that no person may
contract against his own negligence and that it is applicable to the
authority engaged in a public service, and that public policy
forbids that they contract for immunity for their negligence. 82
This principle was used only in support of the Morris opinion, but it
26McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 469 P.2d 997, 998 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970);
accord, Housing Authority v. Morris, 14 So. 2d 527, 530-31 (Ala. 1943); Cerny Pickas & Co.
v. C.R. Jahn Co., 106 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ill. Ct. App. 1952); cf. Kuzmiak v. Brookchester,
11] A.2d 425, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955); Thomas v. Housing Authority, 426 P.2d 836
(Wash. 1967); see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 262, at 1162 (1963).
27 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 262, at 1162 (1963); see Tenants Council v. De Franceaux, 305
F. Supp. 560, 563 (D.D.C. 1969); Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 371 P.2d 131, 133-34
(Kan. 1962); Bell v. McAnulty, 37 A.2d 543, 544 (Pa. 1944).
28 Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 164, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940)
(emphasis added).
29 See generally Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1972, writ granted).
80 Manius v. Housing Authority, 39 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1944).
81 Id.
82 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ
granted).
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was not used as the major premise for the conclusion reached. 83 The
court in Crowell, however, refused to follow the argument in Morris
that exculpatory clauses induce a want of care. As a result, the entire
34
holding of Morris was rejected.
In Morris, the Alabama court refused to make the superficial examination of the statute made in Manius. Instead, it looked to the nature,
purpose, powers, authorities and legislation which brought the housing
authority into being in determining the controlling issues.35 In doing
so, the court determined that the purpose and intent of the legislature
in creating the public housing authority was expressed in the "Housing
Authority Law," and concluded that there was no authority in the act
"that authorizes it to provide ...

for such immunity." 36 "The express

authority in the act of its creation subjecting it to be sued generally
37
indicates a legislative intent to the contrary."
Appellee housing authority in Crowell also argued that to hold exculpatory clauses void as against public policy would infringe on the
parties' right of freedom to contract.38 Thomas v. Housing Authority3 9
is a case in which the Supreme Court of Washington lends support to
the appellants' position. The court in Thomas also cited both the
Manius and Morris decisions, but, unlike Crowell, followed the decision
given in Morris as being "better and more carefully reasoned than in
Manius.'' 40 In discussing the respective parties' right of freedom to

contract the Thomas opinion recognized another basis for holding such
a clause invalid-the unequal bargaining power between the landlord
and41tenant in a lease agreement provided by the public housing authority.

It has been argued that the freedom of choice and freedom of

contract is considerably less than free in a landlord-tenant relationship.
The policy which favors freedom of contract is based on an implication
that the contracting parties have a freedom of choice. 42 Freedom of
33 Housing Authority v. Morris, 14 So. 2d 527 (Ala. 1943); Thomas v. Housing Author-

ity, 426 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1967).
34 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864, 867 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972,
writ granted).
35 Housing Authority v. Morris, 14 So. 2d 527, 530 (Ala. 1943).
36 Id. at 531.
87 Id. at 531.
38 Crowell v. Housing Authority, 483 S.W.2d 864 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ

granted).
39 426 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1967).
40 Id. at 843. In its decision the court stated:
From this expression of the legislature, the conclusion is inescapable that two of
the primary objectives in creating public housing authorities . . . are: (1) to provide
safe and sanitary housing, and (2) to make such housing available to persons of low
income who otherwise would be forced to reside in unsanitary and unsafe housing.
Id. at 842.
41 Thomas v. Housing Authority, 426 P.2d 836, 842 (Wash. 1967).
42 Comment, The Effect of Exculpatory Agreements Upon Landlords' Tort Liability In
Illinois, 54 Nw. U.L. Rav. 61, 69 (1959); see Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 306 (D.C. Cir.
1946). The court here stated:
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contract can be, and has been, limited where the bargaining positions
of the parties might conflict with a dominant public interest.43
Citing Dean Prosser, the court in Thomas felt the way the appellants
had to sign the authority's standard lease form on a "take it or leave
it" basis was an obvious disparity in bargaining power and if allowed
to include an exculpatory clause would have the effect of "putting the
tenants at the mercy of the defendant housing authority's negligence." 44
"This would be contrary to the public policy inherent in the basic
legislation and authorization relative to low rent public housing."4 5
Cases which have cited Thomas in their opinions, but have refused
to follow its decision, can be distinguished by the character and relationship of the parties. They do not deal with a landlord which has a
duty imposed by statute to provide for safe housing as in Thomas.46
It can be inferred from these cases that the courts have restricted the
Thomas decision to cases where duties have been imposed by statute.
The statutes dealt with in Thomas and Morris are very similar in
nature to that found in Texas-article 1269k.4 7 There are no specific
sections within the Texas statute which authorize a public housing
4
authority to exempt itself from the liability of its own negligence. 8
It is true, however, that section 8(a) authorizes the authority ". .. to
make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers of the authority ....-49
When a thorough analysis is made concerning the nature, powers,
and purpose behind the creation of the public housing authority, the
argument that the intent of the Texas Legislature was to impose a
public duty upon the authority to provide safe and sanitary low-rent
housing is well founded. When that purpose is applied to the general
rule which forbids a person to contract away a duty imposed by law, it
suggests that the decision handed down by the Texas court of civil
appeals in Crowell was based on a misinterpretation of article 1269k
as allowing the public housing authority an unlimited right to contract.
The Texas Supreme Court has already declared that the purpose of
[I]tis doubtful whether a clause which did undertake to exempt a landlord from
responsibility for such negligence would now be valid. The acute housing shortage
in and near the District of Columbia gives the landlord so great a bargaining advantage over the tenant that such an exemption might well be held invalid on grounds
of public policy.
48 Comment, The Effect of Exculpatory Agreements Upon Landlords' Tort Liability In
Illinois, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 61, 66 (1959).
44 Thomas v. Housing Authority, 426 P.2d 836, 842 (Wash. 1967).
45 Id. at 842.
46 McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 469 P.2d 997, 999 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); see
Feldman v. Stein Bldg. & Lumber Co., 148 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Kuzmiak v.
Brookchester, Inc., 111 A.2d 425 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955).
47 Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k (1963); see ALA. CODE tit. 25, §§ 6, 12 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.82.010, 35.82.020 (1965).
48 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k (1963).
49 Id. § 8(a).
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